主题：Two-sided Nepotism and Life Expectancy:A Theory of Dynastic Management

时间：2019年5月21日（周二）下午3:00

主讲人：张延人教授（复旦大学）

地点：九游官网网页版登录五楼会议室

摘要:Over the last two centuries, impressive progress in health has led to great increases in life expectancy at all ages. The impact of "health transition" on the governance pattern of family-owned firms has never been formally investigated. To probe the link between family control and life expectancy, I present a model of two-sided nepotism, in which an entrepreneur family leader chooses between designating his heirs as family workers and recruiting some professional workers in the market, and every heir chooses between working for the family leader and departing for the market. Owing to the cross-generation difference in incentive efficiency, there is a tendency for every heir to depart for the market at the beginning of his career, return at some time point, and devote the remaining life to his original firm. As people live longer, the return of the heir would be postponed, and thus the family leader would hire professionals more often to respond to the delayed return of his heir, which results in the decline (rise) of dynastic (professional) management. The main conclusions are robust to the inclusion of human capital accumulation and talent gap between the family and professional workers.